Managing the environment and the economy in the presence of hysteresis and irreversibility by Heijnen, P. & Wagener, F.O.O.
Managing the environment and the economy in the
presence of hysteresis and irreversibility




interest conﬂict models for which several qualitatively different long run outcomes are
possible. We extend the original model by adding the capital stock of an industry as a
second state variable. A government can mitigate the effects of pollution arising from in-
dustrial activities by imposing the requirement to abate emissions. Within this framework
two scenarios are examined. In the social optimal benchmark, the social planner optimally
allocates investment. In the competitive equilibrium, market forces determine the invest-
ment in capital, but the social planner can still abate emissions. We show that in the case
of irreversibilities catastrophes are avoided in the competitive equilibrium when it is so-
cially optimal to do so. However, in the competitive equilibrium, either the catastrophe is
avoided in an inefﬁcient way or the catastrophe is badly managed. In case of hysteresis,
catastrophes are almost always avoided. Moreover, the decision to avoid catastrophes does
not depend on long-term considerations.
JEL-codes: C61, Q20, Q50
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1 Introduction
Ecological studies show that a wide variety of ecological systems (lakes, coral reefs, oceans,
forests, arid lands) do not respond to gradual change in a smooth way (Scheffer, Carpenter,
Foley, Folke, & Walker, 2001). In particular, these systems may be prone to catastrophic shifts,
where a small change in external conditions can drastically alter the steady state of the ecosys-
tem. The paradigmatic model for catastrophic shifts in ecosystems is the so-called shallow
lake (Scheffer, 1998). In its pristine state, a shallow lake exhibits clear water, rich submerged
vegetation and a high number of ﬁsh. The alternative steady state is one with turbid water, a
high concentration of algae and almost devoid of ﬁsh. The external factor that determines the
steady state is the inﬂow of phosphorus. The state of the lake (i.e. its turbidity) seems almost
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1irresponsive to the inﬂow of phosphorus except near a threshold value where, due to biological
feedback mechanisms, the turbidity suddenly jumps from low to high. If the lake ecosystem is
very fragile, the jump is irreversible. But even in less fragile lakes, the inﬂow of phosphorus
has to be lowered far below the threshold value to make the lake jump back to a clear state.
The problem of optimally managing shallow lakes, introduced by M¨ aler, Xepa-
pedeas, and de Zeeuw (2003), is important to environmental economics for two reasons. First,
it captures a basic tradeoff. The inﬂow of phosphorus into lakes is mainly due to the use of
fertilisers. Therefore more intensive agriculture has a detrimental effect on ﬁshery. The ques-
tion then is how to optimally manage the lake taking into account the returns to agriculture and
ﬁshery, and the dynamics of the lake. In more general terms, the model can be used to discuss
the tradeoff between consumption and the state of the environment. The inclusion of this basic
tradeoff is a common feature of the models used in environmental economics. Second, and
more importantly, by incorporating a positive feedback mechanism, it allows to move beyond
simple linear models of the environment. In particular, issues of irreversibility, hysteresis, and
multiple basins of attractions can be studied. This has been the focus of a number of recent pa-
pers (Brock & Starrett, 2003; M¨ aler et al., 2003; Wagener, 2003; Kiseleva & Wagener, 2008).
In the shallow lake model, the optimal policy depends on the initial state of the lake. In certain
cases, if the initial phosphorus level is below a certain threshold, it is optimal to move towards
a clean lake. Otherwise, it is optimal to let the lake become more polluted.
One of the drawbacks of the shallow lake management problem is that, by taking
the stock of pollution as the only stock variable, it implies a highly stylised model of the econ-
omy. In particular, at any moment in time any positive level of consumption can be reached.
We therefore extend the shallow lake model by adding industrial capital as a second stock vari-
able, assuming that the inﬂow of pollution is proportional to the installed base of capital. The
installed base of capital puts constraints on both present and future levels of consumption. We
think of capital as changing on a slower time scale than the state of the environment; as capital
changes slowly, also the inﬂow of pollution adjusts sluggishly. Even in the case of extremely
fast growth, it seems to take more than a generation to change a poor agricultural society in a
rich post-industrial society, while the detrimental effects on the state of the environment of this
change occur earlier.1
We present two extensions of the model of M¨ aler et al. (2003). The benchmark
extension is that of a social planner managing both the industry and the lake. This is then
contrasted to a competitive industry, where the externalities of pollution are not properly taken
into account. As the capital stock of the industry is polluting the environment, we examine
the effect of forcing the industry to clean up part of this pollution. Speciﬁcally, the industry is
taxed and proceedings from this tax are used to clean a ﬁxed proportion of the pollution. This
is different from the situation in M¨ aler et al. (2003) where the tax was returned lump-sum to
society. The tax rate is a ﬁxed constant: this reﬂects the fact that dynamic taxing rules are very
hard to implement, although we investigate one instance where the tax can be adjusted once
over the planning horizon.
The model presented in this paper is related to that of Bovenberg and Heijdra
1The anecdotal evidence is in favour of this statement. Two prime examples of fast economic growth at unprece-
dented level, are Japan and China. Even before their transformation from poor to rich was or is completed, they
experienced or are experiencing grave environmental problem. E.g. the Minamata poisoning in 1965 in Japan (Tim-
othy, 2001) or the attempts of the Chinese government to improve the air quality in Beijing before the Olympics of
2008
2(1998, 2002). The difference is in how we analyse the model. They analyse a non-linear ex-
ternality problem by considering small deviations from the steady state and performing then
a linearization of the model. However in a non-linear system local analysis is in general not
sufﬁcient. This is caused by history dependence. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the effect of initial
level of pollution and government policy, both of which determine which of the steady states is
reached in the long-run. Our contribution is in providing a global analysis.
Our results are the following. We show that in the case of irreversibilities catas-
trophic shifts, or catastrophes for short, are avoided in the competitive equilibrium when it
is socially optimal to do so. However in the competitive equilibrium, either the catastrophe
is avoided in an inefﬁcient way, or the catastrophe is badly managed. In case of hysteresis,
catastrophes are almost always avoided. Moreover, the decision to avoid catastrophes does not
depend on long-term considerations. Hence myopia of the decision maker may not matter that
much for the long-run outcome.
Some recent papers explore similar issues. Ranjan and Shortle (2007) also add
capital dynamics to the shallow lake model of M¨ aler et al. (2003) and ﬁnd environmental
Kuznets curves. However, they do not examine the case of a competitive industry (with correc-
tive taxation/abatement).
Prieur (forthcoming), extending John and Pecchenino (1994), adds non-linear en-
vironmental dynamics to a Diamond-type overlapping generations model. In contrast to the
approach of this paper, he only considers the case of a competitive equilibrium. He ﬁnds that
John and Pecchenino’s result, that abatement is sufﬁcient for environmental quality to improve,
does not hold when environmental dynamics are non-linear. As far as we know, ours is the ﬁrst
paper that compares the optimal solution to the competitive equilibrium.
Janmaat and Ruijs (2007) argue that in models of harvesting the carrying capacity
of the ecosystem depends non-linearly on the harvesting intensity. To model the inﬂuence of
harvesting intensity, they use shallow lake dynamics. They show that to achieve an efﬁcient
outcome taxes need to be initially higher than their efﬁcient levels to avoid moving towards an
undesirable steady state. We shall use this insight in our discussion of optimal state-dependent
tax rates.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced. We
ﬁrst focus on the case of irreversibilities. Section 3 discusses the social planner benchmark.
Section 4 investigates the analogous perfectly competitive economy. In Section 5 the two
economies are compared to each other. Section 6 examines the effect of taxes that change
over time. In Section 7 we turn our attention to the case of hysteresis. In section 8 we perform
a sensitivity analysis. Section 9 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Shallow lake dynamics
The state of the environment is denoted by d  0, the level of phosphorus in the shallow lake.
The change in the level of pollution is given by:




3where b > 0 denotes the sedimentation rate and `  0 the loading, that is, the net inﬂow of
pollutants. The nonlinear term on the right hand side of (1) is a very simple model of the bio-
logical positive feedback mechanisms working in the lake: as the phosphorus level rises above
a threshold value (more accurately a threshold range), the foodweb in the lake breaks down. As
a consequence, a signiﬁcant amount of additional phosphorus is released. Equation (1) gives a
reasonable description of the phosphorus dynamics in shallow lakes. We will use it as a broader
metaphor for non-linearities in ecosystems. Therefore we will refer to the level of phosphorus
as the level of pollution or the level of damage.
The qualitative properties of the shallow lake dynamics depend critically on the
“physical” parameter b. If b  3
p
3=8  0:65, then the dynamics (1) has for every value of ` a
unique steady state: see ﬁgure 1(a). For 1
2 < b < 3
p
3=8 there are for some values of ` several
steady states. However, by shutting down the inﬂow of phosphorus, that is, by setting ` = 0, the
lake regenerates completely and reverts to the pollution-free state d = 0: this is the reversible
case where hysteresis is present, depicted in ﬁgure 1(b). Finally, if 0 < b  1
2, there is a critical
level dcr given by the ﬁrst positive zero of the function d 7!  bd+d2=(d2 +1), which is such
that if d  dcr at t = 0, then even shutting down the inﬂow of phosphorus completely will
not induce the lake to revert to the pollution-free state: this irreversible case is illustrated in
ﬁgure 1(c).
Note that both in the reversible and the irreversible case, if the inﬂow of pollutants
increases slowly and the state of the system is near the low pollution steady state a catastrophic
shift occurs. At the steady state, a slow increase in the pollution level induces an equally slow
response in the level of pollution. There is a critical level `cr such that for ` > `cr the clean
steady state disappears only the high pollution steady state remains. Consequently the level of
pollution starts to increase until it reaches the polluted steady state. We say that the system has
undergone a catastrophic shift, cf. Rinaldi and Scheffer (2000); Thom (1972); Zeeman (1977).
In systems prone to catastrophic shifts, such as the environment, a relatively small
decrease in ` from just above `cr to just below it, can result in very different long-run outcomes.
This often depends on the initial conditions. When managing such systems, this has to be taken
into account.
2.2 The standard shallow lake optimal management problem












subject to the shallow lake dynamics (1) and the initial condition d(0) = d0. The parameter a
determines the relative weight assigned to the environmental damage and  is the discount rate.
We will refer to this optimisation problem as the standard shallow lake problem. Note that
utility is derived both from a higher inﬂow of pollutants, associated with higher production and
hence higher consumption, and a lower level of environmental damage. The optimal inﬂow of
pollutants is determined by this tradeoff.2
Depending on the values of the parameters a, b and , one, two or three three
steady states of the state-costate system; if there are three, they can be ordered by increasing









































































































































































































































































































5levels of pollution. The steady states with the lowest and the highest level of pollution are sad-
dles of the state-costate system; the intermediate steady state is a source. An optimal solution
will move towards one of the saddles; which one it converges to depends on the values of the
parameters and the initial conditions.
In particular, for a large set of parameters there is a threshold state d, which is
such that if the initial level of pollution satisﬁes d(0) > d, the optimal policy moves the
system towards the highly polluted steady state. On the other hand, if d(0) < d, the policy
maker lead the system to the low pollution level steady state. Note that in the irreversible case
necessarily d  dcr. If d(0) = d, there are two possibilities: either there are two optimal
solutions originating at d; then d is called an indifference threshold (or strong Skiba point).
Or there is only a single optimal solution, for which d(t) = d for all t. Then d is a threshold
steady state (or weak Skiba point). See Wagener (2003); Kiseleva and Wagener (2008); Grass,
Caulkins, Feichtinger, Tragler, and Behrens (2008).
2.3 Adding a capital stock
In this article, we extend the standard shallow lake model by adding a capital stock. Capital
produces output and emissions of a pollutant. Output is either consumed, invested in capital or
used for pollution abatement, which can be interpreted as investment in environmental capital.
Investment determines the growth of capital.
We examine two economies. In the ﬁrst, a social planner determines the split
between consumption and investment; this is taken as the socially desirable benchmark. In
the second economy, the production sector is competitive and consumers save to smoothen
their consumption paths. In both economies, we allow for the possibility that emissions can be
abated. Abatement lowers the inﬂow of pollution, but the cost of abatement also lower invest-
ment in capital. The abatement fraction  is a policy instrument, and is taken to be constant.
One interpretation is that reﬂects the slowness of political processes. Or a second interpretation
would be that the fraction  is resulting from some international environmental agreement and
can therefore not be changed easily.
Let K(t) denote the capital stock available in the economy at time t. We assume
that population size and by implication the labour force L = L(t) are constant. Capital and
labour are used to produce output Y = F(K;L), where F(;) is a production function that is










Deﬁne y = Y
L (output per capita), k = K
L (capital per capita) and f(k) = F(k;1). Then
y = f(k), where f() is assumed to be increasing and concave. As a parametric form we will
use f(k) = 1
1 #k1 #.
We assume that the capital stock produces k units of pollution (where  is the
conversion factor) of which a fraction  is removed. The cost of removing one unit of pollution
per unit of time is . A tax of size k is levied to pay for the abatement. We will refer to 
as the level of abatement or as the tax rate (since tax and abatement amount the same in this
model). This differs from M¨ aler et al. (2003), where a pigovian tax whose revenue is returned
as a lump-sum transfer, is introduced. We cover the cost of abatement by a lump-sum tax.
6The national income identity is
y = c + i + k; (4)
where c the level of consumption, i investment in capital and k the cost of cleaning a
fraction  of pollution (or investment in environmental capital if you will). We can without loss
of generality set  equal to one (see the appendix for details). The growth of capital is governed
by the following equation:
_ k = i   k; (5)
where  is the rate of depreciation.











This is also the welfare function for the social planner. The two models, the social planner
benchmark and the competitive equilibrium, differ only in how the level of consumption is
determined. In the social planner benchmark, consumption is chosen such that it maximises
welfare. In the competitive equilibrium, the consumer maximises his utility subject to his bud-
get constraint. The prices and his wage are set in a competitive market. Moreover, the consumer
realises that his inﬂuence on the state of the environment is inﬁnitesimal and subsequently takes
environmental damage as given. Details of both models are given in the appropriate sections.
Finally, we want to be able to control the speed at which capital moves relative to
environmental damage. Therefore the "-parameter is introduced and the evolution of capital is
given by:
_ k = "(i   k) (7)
where small (large) values of " implies that capital moves more slowly (quickly). The appendix
gives details of the derivation. The net inﬂow of pollutants is (1   )k  0, i.e. the part of
pollution that is not abated. The dynamics of environmental damage then becomes:




3 Optimal capital investment policies
3.1 The optimization problem
In this section, the effects of an optimal capital investment policy are analyzed. Recall that
capital dynamics are given by:





where the investment level i is determined by the requirement that the output y equals invest-
ment plus consumption:
y = f(k) = i + c + k: (10)












_ k = "

f(k)   c   ( + )k

; k(0) = k0; (12)
_ d = (1   )k   bd +
d2
1 + d2; d(0) = d0: (13)
To obtain the state-costate equations, form the Pontryagin function3

























The Hamilton function can then be written as





























= (1   )k   bd +
d2
1 + d2; (18)





 + "( +    f0(k))

  (1   )q; (19)










3.2 Investigation of the reduced canonical equations
Before we proceed with the computation of the optimal consumption path, we ﬁrst want to
get some insight in the qualitative features of the dynamical system described by the reduced
canonical equations: in particular the number of steady states for different values of the pa-
rameters. The main parameters of interest will be the level of abatement (or tax rate)  and the
sedimentation rate b.
Throughout the paper the other parameters will have the following values: " =
1
100, # = 3
4,  = 5,  = 4
5,  = 0:045 and a = 1. By taking " this small, we ensure that
capital moves slowly compared to environmental damage. The other parameters do not affect
the qualitative features of the system other than ensuring that the consumer cares enough about
the environment and abatement is not prohibitively costly (high a and low ). Otherwise the
optimal policy would be to ‘ignore’ environmental damage, which is neither true nor interesting
to study.
Figure 2 shows the bifurcation diagram. We either have one saddle or two saddles,
depending mainly on the value of b. If the the lake is irreversible or slightly hysteretic, there
3Also called pre-Hamilton or Hamilton function.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram with respect to b and . The solid line indicates a fold bifurcation.
are two saddles. For b ' 0:51 there is a single saddle. Observe that the value of  hardly
matters: the use of abatement does not seem to inﬂuence the number of saddle points greatly. If
b / 0:51, the situation is more complicated. We leave a full bifurcation analysis to future work
and concentrate here on an exploration of the properties of the model.
3.3 Results
In this section we ﬁx b equal to 0:45, i.e. we focus on the irreversible case. The critical level
of damage dcr for this value of b is 0:627. It implies that we are in the region with three steady
states (cf. Figure 2). The initial level of capital will be set to k0 = 0:01. This is much lower
than the steady state level of capital. Our focus is therefore on developing economies. We start
by examining the effects of changing the level of abatement for a given initial level of damage.
Then we proceed by looking at the optimal level of abatement for different initial levels of
damage.
Figure 3 shows the effect of varying the level of abatement if d0 = 0:5. As 
increases, the asymptotic level of damage becomes lower as was to be expected. The effect
on the asymptotic level of consumption is more interesting. It seems that a higher level of
abatement can be used to increase the asymptotic level of consumption without hurting the
environment in the long run. That is, the extra pollution is more than offset by the extra abate-
ment, which is made possible by higher production. However, this effect is small and eventually
high abatement will lower consumption. Due to dynamical effects, the total effect on welfare
is monotonic. More abatement leads to lower welfare. Hence, the optimal level of abatement is
zero when d0 = 0:5.
Since we are interested in history dependence, we will let the initial level of dam-
age d0 vary between 0:1 and 1:4. We have determined the optimal level of  by computing the
optimised welfare functional J for  = 0;0:1; ;1, and taking the largest. This relatively
crude procedure is imposed by computational restrictions. The results for various initial values
of environmental damage are given in Figure 4. The social planner will not abate if d0  0:5.
For higher initial values the level of abatement will almost be maximal. This increase in abate-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Optimal tax level as function of initial environmental damage, and the corresponding welfare
levels.

































































Figure 5: Asymptotic optimal consumption and damage as function of initial environmental damage,
and the corresponding welfare levels.
expected.) Figure 5 shows that at this point, the system shifts from the clean steady state to
the dirty steady state. Given the irreversibility of the lake, this is unavoidable, but it happens
before the critical level of damage. Avoiding the clean steady state is possible, but too costly.
Now the abatement serves a purpose as it is used to reduce the inﬂow of pollution and make the
dirty steady state less dirty. The tradeoff is that it lowers consumption. Observe that the relative
decrease in the asymptotic level of consumption is small compared to the relative increase in
the asymptotic level of damage (approx. 18% vs. 700%). But if damage is high enough, the
social planner is willing to make this tradeoff. Note that abatement serves as a tool to counter
the negative effects of the high damage steady state. It is not used to prevent a catastrophe.
114 The competitive equilibrium
4.1 The Ramsey model
Our model for the competitive case is based on the Ramsey model. The derivation is standard
(cf. Heijdra and van der Ploeg, 2002, pp. 422–447). Hence we will just summarise the main
assumptions. There is a continuum of identical consumers of mass one aggregated into a single
representative consumer who supplies one unit of labour for which he receives the prevailing
wage rate w(t). Wage is either consumed or put into a bank account. The money in the bank
account b(t) evolves in the following way:
_ b = rb   c + w; (21)
where r(t) is the rate of interest. The discounted value of the consumer’s debt has to be ﬁnite
at any point in time (the No Ponzi Game or transversality condition).










Note that utility is separable in consumption and environmental damage. Combined with the
assumption of a continuum of consumers, each consumers knows that his impact on d(t) is
negligible. Hence the consumer acts as if he maximises
R 1
0 [logc]e tdt. The environment is
a pure externality. Of course the social planner problem of Section 3 did take this externality
into account.
The time path of consumption is then given by
_ c = (r(t)   )c; (23)
where c0 = c(0) is chosen such that the discounted value of life time income equals the dis-
counted value of life time consumption.
The value of r(t) is determined as follows. We assume perfectly competitive and
identical ﬁrms who produce one output (the consumption good whose price is the numeraire)
using capital k(t) and the one unit of labour available. The marginal productivity of capital is
then equal to the factor price:
f0(k) = r(t) +  + ; (24)
where the factor price equal to the sum of the rental price, depreciation and the cost of cleaning
up pollution. We still have that _ k = i   k and y = c + i + k. Combining this all yields the
following dynamics for consumption and capital:
_ k = f(k)   c   ( + )k (25)
_ c = (f0(k)         )c (26)
Under our assumptions on f(), this system has a unique saddle. Given k0, the value of c0 is
obtained by jumping to the stable manifold of this saddle.
The competitive equilibrium of our model than becomes:




_ k = "[f(k)   c   ( + )k]; (28)
_ c = "(f0(k)         )c; (29)
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram with respect to b and . The solid line indicates a fold bifurcation.
where d(0) = d0, k(0) = k0 and c(0) is determined as previously discussed. Recall that the
"-parameter determines the relative speed of the capital-consumption subsystem and is derived
in the same manner as in Section 3.
4.2 Preliminary analysis of the competitive equilibrium
Observethatthecapitalandconsumptiondynamicsdonotdependonthelevelofenvironmental
damage; on the other hand the level of capital does inﬂuence the change in environmental
damage. There is a unique steady state level of capital and consumption, denote this steady state
level of capital by k(). The steady state level of inﬂow of pollution is given by (1 )k().
Consequently the steady state level of environmental damage is determined by:




This equation has between one and three roots depending on the value of  and b. The bifurca-
tion diagram in Figure 6 shows for which values of  and b this is the case. In case of maximal
abatement, there are three steady states if b < 1
2. For lower values of , the number of steady
state may decrease to one. The typical phase portrait for the case of three steady state is given
in Figure 7. Observe that the social planner’s ability to inﬂuence the system is mainly to put the
system in the basin of attraction of the steady state of choice. If the initial level of damage is
high, the social planner may not even have this choice: it can be trapped in the basin of attrac-
tion of high pollution steady state. Then the effect of  is solely to reduce the inﬂow of pollution
and the cost of reducing this inﬂow is a lower stock of capital and level of consumption.
For  = 1, the pollution dynamics are the same in the benchmark and the com-
petitive equilibrium since for  = 1 there is no inﬂow of pollution. Hence the environment
behaves in the same manner. For b < 1
2, there are two steady states, one with low pollution and
one with high pollution. Only the high pollution steady state remains as if b > 1
2. When we
compare Figure 6 to Figure 2, the resemblance becomes less as  becomes smaller. For small
 the competitive equilibrium always moves to the dirty steady state whereas in the benchmark
the clean steady state never disappears.










Figure 7: Typical phase portrait in the competitive case: b = 0:45,  = 0:8. Solid lines indicate trajec-
tories leading to stable steady states. The dashed line is the stable manifold of the saddle separating the
two sinks. The dotted lines are the nullclines. Consumption is not shown, but is always proportional to
the capital stock.
144.3 Result
As in the social planner benchmark, we ﬁx b equal to 0:45. Depending on , this system will
either have three steady states or one (cf. Figure 6). Again the initial level of capital will be set
to k0 = 0:01.
First, to see what the effect of abatement is in the competitive equilibrium, we
pick (k0;d0) = (0:01;0:5) and vary . See Figure 8. We see that  has a purely monotonic
effect. Increasing abatement will lead to lower steady state levels of consumption and damage.
For some point in the interval  2 (0:6;0:7) asymptotic damage jumps down, but asymptotic
consumption (and capital) adjust smoothly. In the social planner benchmark, the steady state
level of consumption was more or less constant, whereas here consumption almost halves over
the range of possible abatement levels.
Note that the large change in welfare is before the ﬂipping point where the system
jumps from a high steady state level of damage to a low steady state level of damage. Again
observe that the ﬂipping point is before the critical level of damage as in the social planner
benchmark. The actual change in welfare after the jump is miniscule in comparison, but there
is an interior maximum around  = 0:7.
Second, the initial level of damage d0 will vary between 0:1 and 1:4. We have
determined the optimal level of  by computing the welfare functional J for  = 0;0:1; ;1,
and taking the largest. Here the relatively crude procedure is not imposed by computational
restrictions, but to make the results comparable to the social planner benchmark. The results
forvariousinitialvaluesofenvironmentaldamagearegiveninFigure9.Forincreasinglevelsof
initial damage, the level of abatement rises. As we see in Figure 10, the purpose of this increase
is to end up in the steady state with low environmental damage. If  increases above a certain
threshold, even the maximum level of abatement will not force the system to the clean steady
state. As in the benchmark, in the competitive equilibrium (almost) full abatement for high
initial levels of damage is optimal and this is reﬂected in the asymptotic level of consumption,
which is declining in the initial level of damage. Limited control implies that an initially more
damaged environment is bad in every possible way.
5 Perfect competition versus the benchmark
For high initial values of damage, d0 > 0:6, the two cases are roughly similar. In both cases,
abatement is high. The asymptotic level of consumption and damage are comparable. Moreover
the difference in welfare is relatively small.
The differences occur when the initial value of damage d0 is lower than 0:6. Here
abatement is used to force the system to the clean steady state. Both in the competitive equi-
librium and the social planner benchmark, they succeed in doing so. Since in the competitive
equilibrium abatement is the only instrument to achieve this, the level of abatement will be
high compared to the benchmark. Consequently the difference in welfare is high.
We conclude that in the case of the competitive equilibrium an environmental
catastrophe is avoided when it is socially optimal. However large differences in welfare occur
























































































































































































































































































































































































Optimal tax vs. initial pollution
(a) Optimal tax

















Welfare vs. initial pollution
(b) Welfare
Figure 9: Optimal tax level as function of initial environmental damage, and the corresponding welfare
levels.



































Asymptotic consumption vs. initial pollution
(a) Consumption




























Asymptotic damage vs. initial pollution
(b) Damage
Figure 10: Asymptotic optimal consumption and damage as function of initial environmental damage,
and the corresponding welfare levels.
176 State-dependent taxation
One could argue that the difference between the benchmark and the competitive equilibrium
will disappear if  can change continuously over time. Due to computational difﬁculties, we
only examine what happens if  can be switched at one point in time between two levels.
The idea is the following. When abatement is a ﬁxed constant, it has to serve two
conﬂicting purposes. The ﬁrst is to make sure that the system ends up in the correct steady
state, which is the main purpose at the early stage. The second purpose is to abate efﬁciently
in a neighbourhood of the steady state. This is the main purpose at the later stage when the
trajectory is actually near the steady state. If we allow the social planner to change the tax rate
at some point in the future, then this conﬂict should be largely resolved.
The abatement scheme will have the following form:
(t) =
(
1 if 0  t < T,
2 if t  T,
(31)
where 1, 2 and T are decision variables. Recall that 1 is used to force the system to a
clean steady state and 2 is an efﬁcient tax near the steady state. We will choose 1 and 2 in
accordance with these roles and independent of the initial state of the system. Hence the only
choice variable will be the switching time T. We allow T to be zero (immediate switching) or
inﬁnitely high (never switch).
The most straightforward way to force the system to the clean steady state is
to pick 1 = 1 (maximal abatement). An efﬁcient tax near the steady state should have the
property that once we are near the steady state, the social planner does not want to renege on
this commitment. Hence 2 is such that it maximises instantaneous welfare subject to being in
the steady state (cf. Janmaat and Ruijs, 2007 or M¨ aler et al., 2003 for similar ideas). We will
refer to this level of abatement as the static optimum OS, and 2 = OS. For the values of the
parameters we use here OS  0:66.
The switching time T is now determined as follows. At time T the social planner
should be indifferent between a level of abatement equal to one and OS. Otherwise it would
be optimal to pre- or postpone the switch to OS. This indifference curve will depend on d and
k only.
In the long run, two things can happen. The social planner never decides to switch
and the environmental damage will be high. Or the social planner does switch to OS. In this
case environmental damage ends up being low. The indifference curve together with the basins
of attractions of these two steady states will characterise the qualitative picture of the dynamics.
Figure 11 shows the indifference curve and the different basins of attractions. The
regions marked (i) are the basin of attraction of the clean steady state P if  = OS. And any
trajectory starting in these two region would have converged to P even without a high initial
level of abatement. Trajectories starting in region (i) switch immediately.
Region (ii) is more interesting. Trajectories starting in this region are neither in
the basin of attraction of P or Q (if  = 1), but they move away from Q and will at some point
intersect with the dashed line. After the switch to  = OS, they will converge to P. In this
region a temporary sacriﬁce will lead to a good long-term steady state. Trajectories starting in
region (iii) are in the basin of attraction of Q and will move toward Q (or another steady state
level with high environmental damage) for any level of abatement.



















and Q, the dirty steady state if  = 1. Trajectories starting in region (i) will converge to P, in region (ii)
they will switch and then converge to P, but they need the initially high level of abatement to converge
to P, in region (iii) they will not switch and converge to Q.
Note that every trajectory that can go to P (as long as T is big enough) will go
to P. This can be interpreted that in the case with irreversibilities, any sacriﬁce in the present
is worth the better steady state outcome. This is remarkable considering the relatively high
discount rate of 0:045 we have chosen.
7 Hysteresis
So far we have only discussed the case where the dynamics of the environment exhibited irre-
versibilities (in particular b = 0:45). We have seen that if the tax can be changed from  = 1
to  = OS, then for every initial state for which it is possible to go to a clean steady state, the
system will go to the clean steady state. Because of irreversibilities, it is impossible to reach a
clean steady state from some initial levels of damage and capital. With hysteresis it is always
possible to go to a steady state with low levels of environmental damage. This suggests that
in systems characterised by hysteresis the social planner will almost always go to clean steady
states.
In this section, we will set b = 0:51. From the bifurcation diagram in Figure 6, we
see that there is only one steady state if  = 1 and this steady state has an steady state damage
level of zero. For lower values of , including OS  0:60, there are three steady states.
Figure 12 shows the optimal ﬁxed abatement as a function of the initial level of
damage. There are no major differences with the irreversible case. For d0 > 0:8, it is optimal
to set abatement equal to one. This implies that the asymptotic damage level will be zero.
This has major implication for the case where the social planner is allowed to
switch from maximal abatement to the optimal static level. Suppose that abatement is at its
maximum level for a sufﬁciently long time. The level of environmental damage will be close to





















Optimal tax vs. initial pollution
Figure 12: Optimal tax level as function of initial environmental damage.
zero and the associated levels of capital and consumption will be low since a substantial amount
of the resources will be used to clean up pollution. Computations show that at this point the
social planner would like to switch to the optimal static tax. This would lead to higher levels of
environmental damage, but it would be compensated by higher levels of consumption.
If at the steady state level associated with  = 1 the social planner strictly prefers
to switch to OS, then the social planner will eventually switch to OS. Hence for the case with
hysteresis the system will always reach the steady state that maximises instantaneous welfare.
Note that this is only true if, for trajectories with high initial levels of damage, the
social planner prefers to set  = 1 above  = OS. Otherwise the system ends up in the high
pollution steady state associated with  = OS. The argument crucially depends on abatement
not being prohibitively expensive.
8 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we will examine the case where the relative weight of the environment is much
smaller, but also abatement is much cheaper. We will return to the case of the irreversible case
where b = 0:45. The parameter values will be " = 1
100, # = 3
4,  = 1,  = 4
5,  = 0:045
and a = 1
20. This section has the same structure. Section 3 and we ﬁrst examine the effect of
abatement for a particular initial level of damage. Then we proceed by examining the optimal
level of abatement for different initial values of damage.
For the particular initial state (k0;d0) = (0:01;0:5), welfare, asymptotic con-
sumption and asymptotic damage are given as functions of the level of abatement in Figure 13.
First, we see that intitially higher levels of abatement lead to higher levels of consumption
while the level of environmental damage hardly changes. At some point this can be no longer
sustained and both consumption and damage decline steeply. This is explained as follows.
Higher abatement has two effects. First, a higher value of  implies a higher level
of capital is possible without making the environment worse off. This higher level of capital
20can sustain higher levels of consumption as well. Second, a higher value of  also implies
higher abatement costs which depress the accumulation of capital. This explains why asymp-
totic consumption ﬁrst increases when there is more abatement, but also why it has to go down
eventually. Abatement creates the possibility to both consume and have a clean environment.
In this case, the optimal level of  is positive and around 0:3.
The results for various initial values of environmental damage are given in Figure
14. We observe a sharp increase of the optimal rate of  as the initial damage increases up
to d0 = 0:5, after which it falls to zero. Welfare drops sharply at the same point.
Figure 15 provides an explanation of these drops in terms of the asymptotic opti-
mal consumption and optimal damage levels. Up to and including d0 = 0:5, imposing abate-
ment has the effect that the optimal investment strategy ends at the clean steady state. However,
the optimal level of abatement has to increase sharply. When this is not economically feasible
any more, the system will end up at the polluted steady state. For these solutions, the best
choice for the level of abatement is  = 0. Note the small consumption gains as contrasted to
the big increase in pollution levels.
Compared to the results in Section 3, two things are noticeable. First, the asymp-
totic level of consumption is increasing in the initial level of damage. Second, abatement is
only used for low levels of initial damage to avoid a catastrophe. If the initial level of dam-
age is high, then the social planner will cease all abatement and hence the asymptotic level of
consumption will grow larger, because the social planner does not abate for higher levels of
initial damage. It is not clear why the social planner stops abating. Given the willingness to
abate for lower levels of initial damage, we could conclude that abatement is relatively cheap
for these values of a and , but then we would also expect full abatement for high levels of
initial damage to alleviate the dirty steady state.
This suspicion is raised further if we turn our attention to the competitive case for
these parameter values. Abatement is apparently cheap and it is optimal to fully abate for every
initial value of d. Therefore the asymptotic level of consumption is independent of the initial
level of damage and there is threshold for which the steady state shift from clean to dirty.
The behaviour in both cases seems to depend on the values of a and  in a non-
trivial manner. The relative cost of abatement should be decreasing in a and increasing in .
Although we would expect the relative cost of abatement to go in the same direction in both
cases. So, higher levels of abatement in the social planner benchmark should coincide with
higher levels of abatement in the competitive case, bit this does not happen.
Still, there are similarities to the original simulations. First, disasters are avoided
when it optimal to do so according to the benchmark. Second, it seems that the use of abatement
in the competitive case (when not used by the social planner in the benchmark) leads to high
disparities in welfare. Here disasters are badly managed, in the original simulations they were
poorly avoided. In both cases, the competitive equilibrium made use of abatement whereas the
benchmark did not.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a ﬁrst foray in adding a (simple) model of the economy to the
standard shallow lake model. The social planner benchmark was compared with a competitive

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14: Optimal tax level as function of initial environmental damage, and the corresponding welfare
levels.





































































Figure 15: Asymptotic optimal consumption and damage as function of initial environmental damage,
and the corresponding welfare levels.
23In the irreversible case, a ﬁxed level of abatement was sufﬁcient to avoid catastro-
phe (when in the benchmark the social planner would also have avoided it). This happened for
low initial levels of environmental damage. Large disparities in welfare can occur when abate-
ment is used extensively in the competitive case, but not in the socially optimal benchmark.
In the competitive equilibrium, either the catastrophe is avoided in an inefﬁcient way or the
catastrophe is badly managed.
Next the effect of a simple state-dependent level of abatement on the competitive
economy was investigated. The social planner was allowed to switch from an emergency level
of abatement (i.e. removing all pollution) to the efﬁcient level of abatement at some point in
time. The effect of this was that the system moved to a clean steady state whenever possible.
These insight were used to study the case where the system exhibited hysteresis.
It was shown that the state-dependent level of abatement always steered the system towards a
clean steady state. The reason behind this is that, for high initials level of pollution, the social
planner prefers to abate all pollution. With hysteresis, this implies that eventually environ-
mental damage will be low (and then the planner will change towards the social optimal tax).
However, since this is so far into the future, the decision to abate maximally will be mainly
inﬂuenced by current conditions. Tentatively, we conclude that if the current initial state is bad
enough to force the social planner to abate and hysteresis is present, then action will be taken
when it is needed.
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A Parameter rescaling
The starting point is the following system:
@d
@~ t







= f(k)   c   ~ ~ k   k; (33)
where a parameter with a tilde corresponds to the parameters without tilde employed in the
main text. Note that we have introduced a parameter ~ 
, which denotes the strength of the
feedback. In the standard formulation of the shallow lake model the parameters are already
rescaled such that ~ 
 is equal to one. Moreover we have substituted i = f(k) c  ~ ~ k in the
last equation.
We will change the time scale. The new time scale t is such that t = 1
~ t, making
the new time scale a factor  slower than the original time scale. This also changes the param-
eters. The sedimentation rate, measured in units per unit of time, changes by a factor 1
 when












and  = ~ : (34)
















= (f(k)   c   k   k): (36)
Along similar lines by rescaling t (again) and k we can set  = 
 = 1 yielding equations (8)
and (7). Rescaling t and k implies that the following parameters have to be rescaled: , ,  as
well as the units in which consumption c is measured.
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